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Abstract 
The economics of contracting have received rather limited attention insofar as the implications for 
efficiency from the selection of types of contracts employed in the aerospace and defence sector are 
involved. The paper analyzes the challenges confronting the cost-plus/cost-reimbursement type of 
contracts of European Commission and intergovernmental organizations like the European Space 
Agency (ESA), who are involved in security and defence projects with significant multiplier effects 
within defence and security networks. The analysis indicates how institutional limitations result in 
contractual choice inefficiencies and anti-competitive practices that may affect the whole of the 
aerospace industrial base, including subcontractors. The paper concludes with policy implications and 
further research recommendation.  
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to examine the procurement practices in the European space sector that has 
arguably been described as a raw model for intergovernmental collaboration leading to integration. 
The analysis looks at how the intergovernmental nature of ESA politicizes the contractual aspects of its 
programs, but also the European value added chain, by both incentivizing the contractors to incorporate 
political objectives in their economic behaviour, but also through the challenges in employing 
contractual schemes with transparent monitoring and accountability. 
The case of the European commercial airliners industry has received more public attention owing not 
simply to the success of the initial joint venture of Airbus that led the consolidation of the European 
aerospace industry first through EADS and since 2015 Airbus group, but also owing to the commercial 
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nature of the sector. In contrast, the European space sector is heavily dependent not only in terms of the 
development efforts, but also in terms of the global market outlook both of which are 
government-centric. The European main institution for collaborative space programs has historically 
being the European Space Agency (ESA), more recently joined by the European Commission in what 
at times seemed an unclear and ad-hoc developing relationship (Note 2). ESA though is the main 
enabler in terms of technical expertise for European collaboration in space and for small countries 
virtually the only economical way of space involvement. This is owed to the sometimes controversial 
fair return principle that is typical of R&D programs in space and not only, whereby work allocation to 
national industries match the government contributions to joint undertakings.  
ESA’s intergovernmental nature results in scarce information being made public which is a further 
reason for the lack of attention by the literature. It is noteworthy that the space industry is critical for 
the aerospace sector as a whole not only due to its technical characteristics and multiplier effects 
(Zervos, 2011a), but also due to its embedding under common aerospace industrial integrators with 
expected benefits from synergies in R&D and economies of scale and scope (see Logsdon et al., 1998; 
and more recent OECD, 2012). This paper thus examines the process of procurement of ESA and how 
the industrial consolidation and effort of ESA to maintain its industry development role and 
procurement efficiency is a challenging multiple set of objectives.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: key background information relating to the space sector 
are presented followed by procurement practices and challenges literature with space implementation 
specific analysis. The ESA institutional mandate to achieve fair return and assist industrial development 
and its implications for the value chain is then examined and an illustrative modeling example is used 
to indicate how under certain conditions a “from cradle to grave” control over the value added chain 
can pose some challenges by nullifying competitive pressures and emphasizing political influences that 
potentially might be counterproductive even for the objective of industrial development per se. The 
paper concludes with emphasis on more information availability and transparency requirements for 
conclusive analysis in view of the attributed significance of space programs for economic development 
and anticipated high technological externalities. 
 
2. Background to the European Space Industry 
The space industry in Europe has experienced a number of “artificial” (non-market) transformations 
leading to the first major multinational space integrator, namely Airbus. A number of mergers and 
acquisitions that drove industrial concentration at national level took place in the 1990s with noticeable 
examples Spain, Germany, the UK, France. During a second wave, national champions were then 
merged into EADS under the “Astrium” division for space products and services with few remaining 
outside this (e.g., cases like Thales Alenia). More recently, a third wave of newly sprung businesses has 
emerged with newly formed space companies, but on lesser than a space integrator scale (e.g., OHB- 
see CSIS, 2001; and Zervos, 2011a).  
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On the demand side, Europe prouds itself on being less dependent on government markets as opposed 
to the US and other space faring nations like China, Japan, India. Arguably the only less dependent 
space industry on (own) government sales was Russia for much of the post-Cold War period, whereby 
the sizeable and shrinking space industry survived on export and technology “sell-off” primarily to the 
West (US and Europe) in exchange for hard currency during times of post-Soviet economic turbulence 
and evaporating government budgets. The public sector role in developing and supporting 
technologically, financially and contractually the space sector is crucial, frequently citing infant 
industry arguments in favor of public support, but also technological externalities and security 
considerations driving arguments for autonomy. The industrial policy of perhaps the biggest European 
public customer, the intergovernmental ESA is a noteworthy example. The industrial and procurement 
policy of ESA has been a point of debate and contention between member states, as well as US 
industrial firms that claimed unfair competition from such practices as early back as the 1980s (Note 
3).  
ESA follows a fair return industrial policy since the early days of its creation, following the 
ELDO/ESRO merging in the 1970s. Under this policy, member state contribution to the ESA budget for 
space programs and services is expected to lead to equi-proportionate returns in the form of contracts to 
the members state’s industry (ESA, 2005). Clearly, this mechanism (typically employed in 
collaborative programs in high technology areas and defence) brings benefits in allowing national 
policy-makers to justify funding allocated to collaborative programs and facilitating thus the funding of 
projects. The criticism has been historically focused on the allocative efficiency of the funds, as this is 
on the basis of the origin, rather than on the basis of industrial/cost efficiency. ESA is thus frequently 
perceived as acting as an industrial developer for “infant” (or perhaps more accurately “more infant”) 
industries. It is therefore possible that the contracting practices and allocation of resources takes place 
not only on non-market criteria, but also on project non-cost efficiency criteria (Zervos, 2011b).  
The consolidation of the industry at the European level through the formation of a major space 
integrator and a small number of major space contractors was not matched throughout the value chain, 
since the lower tiers of the industry (space industrial base) does not seem to be subject to the same 
consolidation. As a result, it is quite possible that ESA’s awarding of major projects to main contractors 
could potentially lead to an unintended geographical distribution of lower-tier contracts.  
Further than that, contract monitoring and application of cost-plus and incentive type of contracts 
potentially can lead to high transaction costs in the form of lengthy negotiations across national 
policy-makers regarding accountability and reward allocation. ESA is generally perceived as practicing 
simple contract types like firm-fixed price, which in case of low technology readiness level or high risk 
projects can lead to inefficiencies. There is limited publicly available information on relevant practices 
and data is well-documented but not for public use/distribution. There is evidence that in practice 
non-fixed contracts are implemented throughout the lifetime of a project, a theme examined in more 
detail on section 3 within the framework of space sector contractual practices. 
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3. Background in Contracting Literature and Practices with Space Applications 
In basic research and technology type of contracts, where the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) is 
low and there are high risks and unknown factors involved, the preferred type of contract is a cost-plus 
type of contract. This allows the customer to absorb the risk associated with the relevant technology 
developments, rather than the contractor. Programs under such contracts would shift the technology 
level and would thus be depicted along the dashed line in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Performance versus Cost for Different Technology Levels 
Source: Adapted from Zervos, 2011a. 
Note. The dashed line represents a future, higher-level cost-effectiveness frontier, following 
investments in basic technology and relevant time-to-maturity. The continuous line represents the 
pareto-optimal trade-off frontier between cost and effectiveness under current technology. 
 
The creation of new technology has external benefits to the project itself, hence high-technology 
projects are associated with market failures and government support. 
In a seminal paper, Arrow discusses how non profit organizations are best placed to pursue knowledge 
associated with invention noting the challenges faced when cost-plus contracts are issued: 
“A second example is the cost-plus contract in one of its various forms. When production costs on 
military items are highly uncertain, the military establishment will pay, not a fixed unit price, but the 
cost of production plus an amount which today is usually a fixed fee. Such a contract could be regarded 
as a combination of a fixed-price contract with an insurance against costs. The insurance premium 
could be regarded as the difference between the fixed price the government would be willing to pay and 
the fixed fee. Cost-plus contracts are necessitated by the inability or unwillingness of firms to bear the 
risks. The government has superior risk bearing ability and so the burden is shifted to it. It is then 
Cost 
Performance 
Metrics 
(measures of 
effectiveness) 
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enabled to buy from firms on the basis of their productive efficiency rather than their risk bearing 
ability, which may be only imperfectly correlated. But cost-plus contracts notoriously have their 
adverse allocative effects. This somewhat lengthy digression on the theory of risk bearing seemed 
necessitated by the paucity of literature on the subject. The main conclusions to be drawn are the 
following: (1) the economic system has devices for shifting risks, but they are limited and imperfect; 
hence, one would expect an underinvestment in risky activities; (2) it is undoubtedly worthwhile to 
enlarge the variety of such devices, but the moral factor creates a limit to their potential” (Arrow, 1962, 
pp. 613-614). 
Hitch (1962) using examples from the military/space industry (Atlas and Titan program) presents the 
challenges associated with the issuing of cost-plus contracts resembling the famous thoughts of a US 
astronaut during launch on how reassuring he felt knowing that each component on the rocket was 
provided by the lowest bidder: 
“Nevertheless, the new policy appears far from ideal. The aircraft companies risk nothing (even the cost 
of preparing designs is usually reimbursed). Because of the great uncertainties involved in any major 
development, it is hard to make a wise selection at the design stage. Companies have a natural tendency 
to be optimistic in estimating performance, cost, and availability at this stage—sometimes much more so 
than at other stages as Klein and Marshall and Meckling have shown. Arid the Air Force has a natural 
tendency to favor the more optimistic proposals. As a result, the specifications in the development 
contract are sometimes unrealistic to the point of causing inordinate delay. Moreover, once the winner 
has been selected, there is no more competition. The company may put its best team on the development 
for the sake of patriotism or its own long term reputation, but the powerful incentive of competition is 
lacking. Partly for this reason the Air Force, locked to a sole source with a cost-plus contract, has to 
exercise a kind and degree of control during the development process that is inconsistent with 
management prerogatives as they are understood and practiced in other parts of the free enterprise 
economy. I believe the inefficiencies resulting from these policies and procedures are serious, and 
worthy of much more attention by economists. It does no good simply to inveigh against the iniquities of 
cost-plus contracting and government risk bearing when we are unable to propose a practical 
alternative. Perhaps part of the answer lies in some form of risk sharing. What is badly needed here is an 
economics invention or, more probably, several of them. The government is going to be in the business of 
supporting research and development on a large scale for a long time, and it is important that it use 
policies that take advantage of the incentives present in the economy” (Hitch, 1962, p. 626). 
It is clear that the issue of contract monitoring for cost-plus contracts is critical for performance. This 
comes at a cost. In the US, the concept of Earned Value Method System (EVMS) has been developed 
for Federal contracts. This concept is simple in its principle, but rather complicated and costly in its 
implementation. The monitoring costs are often cited a major obstacle in monitoring performance and 
could result in even higher transaction costs in the form of legal disputes (Zervos, 2011b). 
In Europe, primarily the UK is employing the EVMS model (MoD), while the major space agency ESA 
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follows a far more complicated and origin-based approach. Specifically, ESA owing to its 
intergovernmental nature is perceived as subject to political influences from national industrial policies, 
hence could be far more challenging to monitor and assign accountability to subcontractors, since part 
of the raison d’être of its operations is to advance industry and development (through fair return) not to 
achieve cost efficiency. Therefore, locking the contract profile at an early stage is preferred to having a 
tedious and politically sensitive with added high transaction costs and potential disputes monitoring 
system required for cost-plus contracts.  
Though official data is unavailable, since ESA only publishes data agreed upon by all member states, it 
is estimated that up until the early 2000s the majority of contract value was awarded under Fixed-Price 
(FP) contracts. More recently, a novel type of contract was developed namely the “ceiling price to be 
converted to fixed price” contract (CP-FP). This contract invention was generated out of the high 
transaction costs associated with the lengthy and sometimes controversial negotiations of the typical FP 
contract applied to a new-technology space program where a cost-plus type might have been more 
suitable on economic grounds. 
Zervos (2011b) describes the process as follows: “The process of a typical contract can be summed up 
as follows: a firm-fixed-price contract is negotiated and agreed upon between ESA, followed by a the 
initiation of the programme’s early phases (Phase A and B- see NASA 2007). At a later point in the 
programme’s phases (during Phase C, or D for example, NASA, 2007), where advancements in 
technological risky/uncertain areas have developed, an Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) is put 
forth and subjected to a technical evaluation by the programme manager who then needs to put it 
through a cost-assessment and approval process, following which, a CCN [ed. Contract Change Notice] 
is added as a new clause to the contract. For example, in 2005 ESA placed 778 contracts and 353 work 
orders, but over 2300 contract change notices (Reynaud, 2005). Despite the fact that most of those 
programmes were placed under a firm-fixed price regime, the change notices that occur cause de-facto 
variations relating to the original contract scheme. In addition, Reynaud, 2005 reveals that the direct 
negotiation contracts (251) are less than the open competition ones (238). Competition is a challenge 
for ESA and European national space agencies, given the consolidated national and European space 
industrial base, coupled with the fair return principle. This is highlighted by the cases where lack of 
competition in contracting is justified by ESA’s guidelines” (ESA, 2008, pp. 23-25). ibid. 
Since Hitch (1962), there has been a substantial spectrum of literature that sprung out of the economics 
discipline, but has largely focused on procurement and effort (see for example Laffont & Tirole, 1993), 
rather than the inventions referred to by Hitch. 
In summary, the differences between cost-plus, fixed-price (with CCN) and CP-FP appear to be not as 
important as the different titles suggest, but certainly presenting different challenges to the sharing of 
risk and the efficiency of the process. A critical factor appears to be the actual implementation practice 
followed, rather than the generic “title” of the contract. Clearly a fixed price contract that is subject to 
CCNs is a renegotiated contract based on ad-hoc cost-related information that is not necessarily 
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considered at the time of the drafting (or accurately estimated). Thus, a cost-overrun by definition 
changes the nature of the contract and voids it as a FP. Similar renegotiations can take place for a CP 
contract, despite the more degrees of freedom allowed with regards to cost uncertainties, or even for a 
CP-FP type. For example, the non-full funding commitment by the principal at the time of the initial 
signing of the contract introduces lock-in elements and challenges for investment specificity:  
“A cost-plus contract typically allows for the contractor to spend a proportion above the expected 
value, but on this overrun there is no profit, hence no incentive for such overruns. However, when 
successfully negotiated if a contract does not ‘lock’ in terms of its funding profile by full commitment of 
the funding authority, then the contractor effectively is facing an annual re-negotiation process for each 
incremental funding period. In effect, the cost-overruns become part of next period’s profile and thus 
are never treated as overruns. The overrun is real in terms of the overall project, but has little impact 
on the contractor’s profitability, or incentives. The same can be said about ESA’s contract with ceiling 
price to be converted into fixed price (CP-FP). To illustrate this, what would be considered contract 
overruns under a well-defined, cost-plus, or fixed-price contract at the signing of the contract, become 
‘additional information’ leading to a de-facto re-drafting of the contract terms. For NASA, this takes 
place on an annual basis, for ESA’s CP-FP contracts this institutionally is supposed to happen once” 
(Zervos, 2011b).  
However, in the absence of relevant information, it cannot be excluded that CCNs are taking place 
under ESA CP-FP contracts resulting in high transaction costs and challenges in estimating contract 
efficiency.  
Importantly, though, despite the challenges associated with contracting types and choices, the line of 
accountability within the principal agent framework in the classic model runs from the government to 
the space agency to the contractor and the subcontractors in a linear mode. It would seem obvious that 
in the opposite case, where non-linearities are present, there would be scope for blurred lines of 
accountability and authority. For example, traditionally, the responsibility for the selection of the prime 
rests with the space agency (Note 4). Despite possible indirect political pressures by potential higher 
political entities to influence the process, direct interference under many political systems could be 
seen as legally and politically abnormal. In a similar manner, the contractor is responsible for the 
subcontractors if the line of accountability is to be fully exhausted on him by the principal for contract 
performance. 
This changed formally by ESA in 2012 with the introduction of best practices guide, where effectively 
ESA attempted to apply the fair return principle across the value chain. Given the presence of high 
value programs and a consolidated contractor tier, this certainly appears to have benefits in the form of 
actual rather than nominal application of the fair return principle. Given the early experiences of the 
integrators in terms of corporate governance and the presence of government within the governing and 
funding mechanisms it seems likely that distortions in the allocation and potential conflicts could arise 
that would not be compatible with the fair return approach adopted by the principal, but with national 
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industrial policies (rather than with competitive considerations). 
More specifically, in 2012, a best practices guide was introduced in ESA’s procurement practices and 
became available through its electronic procurement network (EMITS). At the core of the process is the 
presence of an Industrial Procurement Plan (IPP) that would among other things allow ESA to assess 
the make-or-buy decisions of the contractor, both in terms of the actual decision, but also of the method 
of implementation (competitive contract, direct placement, etc.): 
“a) The IPP will be established by the Prime Contractor as part of his proposal, at the date required 
by the Agency and will:  
-take into account all pertaining requirements such as, but not limited to, geographical distribution, 
Industrial policy and special measures introduced by the Agency at the time of its ITT/RFQ; and,  
-develop the strategy proposed to achieve these requirements.  
b) The proposed IPP will be evaluated as part of the tender evaluation process and will be negotiated 
by the Agency with the Prime Contractor prior to the placing of the contract by the Agency” (ESA, 
2012, pp. 10-11). 
Clearly, the contractor must take into consideration the fair return approach and implement it 
accordingly in negotiation with the principal. The guidelines specify the process as follows: 
“IPP content: 
i. The categorisation of each ‘make’ or ‘buy’ proposal with the justification for such categorisation in 
consideration of the programme specific criteria (including geographical requirements);  
… 
vii. For activities/products categorized as ‘buy’ outside Europe, a detailed justification of the reasons 
why it cannot be ‘buy’ in Europe” (Ibid.). 
The implementation is based upon the operations of a tender evaluation board by the contractor to 
select sub-contractors with the possible inclusion of an ESA representative as follows: 
“…iii. (A) representative(s) of ESA will be designated by the ESA Project Manager to participate as 
member(s) of the TEB” (ibid.). 
The contractor under this scheme is to recommend to the agency for a decision with limited ability for 
appeal, as the ombudsman concept has low applicability as follows: 
“i. The Contractor's recommendation for selection will be made on the basis of the evaluation results 
of the TEB -also when it was an ESA lead TEB- and any other constraints and considerations of the 
programme, including if any the geographical distribution objectives or special measures defined by 
the Agency at the time of the issuing of the ITT/RFQ. 
iii. This recommendation shall be send to the Agency's Project Manager and Agency's Responsible 
Contracts Officer by secured means and addressed to the Agency's Responsible Contracts Officer”. 
…“i. Upon receipt of the recommendation, the Agency shall decide within a period of five working 
days, (unless justified circumstances prevent such response) either to endorse the recommendation or 
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to request that it be submitted for decision to a Joint ESA/Industry Senior Procurement Board with a 
possibility of appeal at higher management level in case of persisting disagreement.  
ii. The Agency shall always have the right to request, if so desired, a new evaluation, in such case the 
Agency shall notify both the Prime Contractor and the interested Contractor of the reasons for its 
decision.  
… 
ii. The Ombudsman shall not be competent for receiving complaints concerning disputes between the 
Agency and Industry in the frame of Best Practices.  
iii. The Ombudsman shall not be competent to receive and investigate complaints based on questions of 
Industrial Return and Geographical Distribution” (Ibid, pp. 11-13). 
This change is expected to have long-run implications for the European space-industrial complex. The 
linear, classic model of government-agency-contractor-subcontractor in terms of accountability and 
management practices is expected to evolve in a more matrix-type format (Figure 2). This may result in 
accountability issues with non-discreet decisions implications at management and governance levels. 
As the space sector is best characterized as an “opaque” operations sector in terms of its corporate 
governance owing to security considerations, but also the dominant role of the government, the absence 
of arm’s length contractual relationships between the space agency and the SIB may have challenges 
for efficiency in the future. 
 
 
Figure 2. Procurement Process in the European Space Value Chain and Industrial Complex 
 
Overall, both the absence of a formal monitoring system for what effectively constitutes cost-plus 
contracts and the matrix framework throughout the value chain point to a complex partnership-based, 
(prime) Contractor 
Agency / ESA 
Ministerial Council 
Government entities 
2
nd
 tier subcontractors 
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rather than market-based model (Note 5). This can potentially nullify cost-risk based competition that 
in the absence of a market and a contestable framework can enhance moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems.  
 
4. A Model Application 
The implications of the lower-tiers of the space industrial base for the efficiency of the space markets 
can be significant depending on whether subcontractors represent a competitive, or vertically integrated 
segment. A model can be used to draw some illustrations since the conduct of the space agency like 
ESA can determine the degree of vertical integration. Specifically, a model can be used to analyze and 
compare across different structures related to lower-tiers of the US and the European space industrial 
base (LSIB) on the performance of the respective industries in commercial and public markets as well 
as, on public procurement (Note 6). We thus compare the results of four industrial structures:  
1) The US and European integrators openly subcontract work to either the US, or the European 
LSIB (open US and European integrator’s markets).  
2) US or European integrators merge with their subcontractors, while the other area’s integrators 
face a monopoly from the domestic LSIB.  
3) Both the US and European integrators vertically integrate (merge) with their subcontractors. 
4) The US and European integrators subcontract work only to the domestic LSIB. 
It is clear that these scenarios represent different procurement and industrial policy regimes. For 
example, Scenario 1 would require changes in export restrictions regulations (Note 7) and procurement 
in the US, such as the “Buy American Act” and extension of Foreign Acquisition programs at 
subcontractor’s level, and Europe, such as the “fair return” industrial policy. Specifically, for the fair 
return changes, it seems as if the new policy changes of ESA are augmenting the fair return principle, 
hence arguably, the scenario closer to developments could be considered to be the last one (scenario 4). 
This is reinforced by the presence of regional industrial interests and groups represented in the US 
Congress, which is the analogous of the ESA ministerial council, meaning is the funding body for the 
agency budget. Thus, in both these cases, whether institutionalized (ESA fair return), or through a more 
open political negotiation process, for both NASA and ESA regional returns play a crucial role for the 
funding providers of their budgets. 
It is expected that scenario 4 would be a poor choice by integrators, as they both face a monopoly in 
terms of their subcontractor markets.  
We assume the presence of two oligopolistic contractors (integrators) supplying one (domestic) 
government market and one commercial market (where they compete) and two major subcontractors 
(one US and one European). The cost of integrators is characterized by the presence of just one input 
whose amount is proportional to final space product production (for public and commercial goods), 
with assumed proportion 1 to 1. Subcontractors face constant per unit costs, while integrators face 
economies of scale and scope. Subcontractors when facing competition are assumed to compete in 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jepf             Journal of Economics and Public Finance                 Vol. 4, No. 1, 2018 
111 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
price, which is set equal to per unit cost, justified due to the highly contestable market (in this case, 
prices for subcontractors are competitive, similar to a Bertrand price competition, and equal to per unit 
costs, assumed zero for simplicity). Under contestable sub-contractors markets, cost of subcontractor 
input to integrators is normalized to zero, while when inputs are derived from vertically integrated 
integrators with in-house production, the cost to the integrator is normalized to 1 (assuming no 
economies of vertical integration present). In contrast, when the subcontractor enjoys a monopoly, then 
the cost of his input to the integrator is variable. We further assume that a subcontractor merged with an 
integrator does not supply the other integrator, but instead become exclusive, in-house producer. 
The cost characteristics of the US and European integrators depend on production technology and thus 
do not vary depending on different market structures at the integrators level, but do vary, depending on 
the price paid for inputs from subcontractors. Note that for simplicity it is assumed that one unit of 
input by subcontractors equals one unit of output. Assuming that the price paid for each unit of input by 
each subcontractor is A, the TC function for the integrator takes the following form: 
Ci = Ai(qi + qdi) + F + Φ(qi + qdi) + αi(qi2 + qdi2) + αii(qiqdi)  (1) 
where i = 1 (US integrator), 2 (European integrator) 
Ai = Cost of integrator “i” for each unit of input, which equals the price charged by the subcontractor. 
F = fixed costs 
αii = coefficient denoting economies of scope 
αi = coefficient denoting economies of scale 
qi = the quantity of the commercial space good supplied by integrator “i” 
qdi = the quantity of the government purchased space good by the US and the European public sectors. 
Assuming the per unit costs of the subcontractors are constant and normalized to zero, the profits of the 
subcontractors when they are a monopolist supplier of subsystems for the respective space integrator 
are assumed to be given by the following: 
Pi = Ai(qi + qdi)    (2) 
Where Pi = profits of subcontractor “i”  
For the case of competitive pricing this is assumed to be equal to zero, while in the case of 
subcontractor being a monopolist, Ai is solved for maximizing profits (Pi), given qi, qdi. The value of 
the quantities are derived from the competition in the integrators market. Following the assumption 
made with respect to the subcontractors market their profitability is zero, assuming competition 
between them (contestability), while in the case of in-house production the value of A for the respective 
integrator in (1) is set to 1, representing higher cost from in-house production of sub-components. 
The inverse demand function for the commercial space good is assumed to be of the following form: 
p = a − b(q1 + q2)    (3) 
where p = price of the commercial space good and a, b are assumed greater than zero. 
The inverse demand functions (government) for the USA and European firms are assumed to be of the 
following form: 
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pdi =  c − d(qdi)    (4) 
where pdi = the price of the domestic public space good in the US and the European markets 
respectively, and c, d > 0. 
At the competitive, commercial market, the US and European space industries compete “a la Cournot”, 
meaning that they choose the level of output each will produce taken as given the rival’s level of 
production and then they compete in prices. By incorporating Ai, the resulting “augmented” model 
essentially introduces quasi-strategic variables across different market structures, as any of the two 
integrators is assumed to be able to choose Ai, but the Ai it will end-up with, depends on the Ai chosen 
by the other integrator. If, for example, starting from an initial stage of open subcontractor markets, the 
US integrator vertically merges with the US subcontractor, then this leaves the European integrator 
facing an uncompetitive market, where the European subcontractor is a monopolist, unless the 
European integrator merges with its subcontractor as well. Any integrator therefore has a choice: it can 
buy-out its subcontractor (or begin in-house production on existing contracts forcing the subcontractor 
to close down, or be acquired), which results in increased costs, compared to the case where he faced a 
contestable subcontractor’s market structure, but at the same time this leaves the other integrator facing 
a monopoly by its subcontractor. This is not monopolization of the market, as the non-merged 
integrator faces a monopoly, but not by the merged firm (assuming of course that the integrators face 
open procurement choices and are not confined to using domestic suppliers as is currently the case) 
(Note 8). 
Based on the scenarios perceived as most relevant earlier, four such calibrations are performed and 
compared (Table 2). As the comparison reveals, integrators facing a monopoly will choose to merge 
with the subcontractor, thus reducing the number of compared outcomes, leaving as the only remaining 
decision for the integrators whether to merge, or not (Note 9). However, there is one market structure 
whereby joint profitability of the respective space industries, which includes profits of contractors and 
subcontractors is maximized. The fourth scenario is therefore desirable for both integrators and 
subcontractors, provided the winners (subcontractors) compensate the losers (integrators), which leaves 
both parties better-off. This option is however unlikely to exist without the assistance by the public 
sectors to monitor such transfers, effectively controlling the SIB (Note 10). 
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Table 1. US and European Space Integrators Performance Under Different Subcontractors 
Scenarios 
Different Subcontractors Market- Structures 
Facing Space Integrators and Respective 
Values for A1 (US) and A2 (Europe) 
Equilibrium Results for Space Integrators Markets 
Prices Quantities Profits 
P pd1 pd2 q1 q2 qd1  qd2  profit1 profit2 
1 Both subcontractors markets open 
(contestable) 
A1 = 0; A2 = 0 
51 
 
31.6 
 
31.6 
 
12.2 
 
12.2 
 
4.6 
 
4.6 
 
400 
 
400 
2 US Integrator merged, EU faces a 
monopoly (A2 solved for) 
A1 = 1; A2 = 23 
58 
 
31.5 
 
43 
 
14 
 
6.7 
 
4.6 
 
1.7 
 
526 
 
74 
3 Both Integrators merged with their 
domestic subcontractors 
A1 = 1; A2 = 1 
52 
 
32 
 
32 
 
12 
 
12 
 
4.5 
 
4.5 
 
386 
 
386 
4 Both Integrators face a monopoly 
from their domestic subcontractor 
(A2 and A1 solved) 
A1 = 26; A2 = 26 
67 
 
44 
 
44 
 
8.2 
 
8.2 
 
1.4 
 
1.4 
 
130 
 
130 
Note. The values of Ai in italics in the first column of the Table are being solved for in the model, the 
other values (0, or 1) represent the price integrators have to pay for subsystems procured from a 
competitive subcontractors market, or built in-house. The values of profits, and prices are in monetary 
terms. 
 
Table 2 shows how both integrators have an incentive to consolidate with regards to their industrial 
base. There is ample evidence on this, notwithstanding the newly formed SpaceX vertical integration 
model of production, while in Europe, as we saw since 2012 this process is effectively further 
influenced by the public sector (ESA). The dilemma faced by the integrators in such a strategic 
environment is whether to merge, or not. Both integrators decide depending on what they expect their 
rival to do. As a result, in the absence of commitment mechanism, such as a binding agreement, or 
appropriate government policies prohibiting their acquisition of the subcontractors they both end-up 
merged. 
It is noted that formal vertical merging is not necessary, but can be an option, as is other scenarios 
depending on the discretion and conduct of ESA, that is not necessarily time-consistent. In view of the 
complex political environment and multiple stakeholders, lack of transparency and level of control over 
the industry this is clearly a promising area for further empirical analysis. 
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Table 2. Profits for US and European Integrators under Different Alternatives 
(Profit US Firm, Profit EU firm) 
 US Space Integrator 
 Merged Not Merged 
European 
Space 
Integrator 
Merged (386, 386) (74, 526) 
 Not Merged (526, 74) (400, 400) 
Note. Profits are in monetary units (US$). The first number in the parenthesis represents the profits at 
each state of the US space integrator, while the second number the profits of the European space firm. 
 
ESA procurement policies since 2012, but also the vertical integration of newly sprang launching firms 
in the US that are potentially competing for the same markets as the US monopoly (ULA, recently 
augmented by SpaceX, with potential for a future duopoly market) reinforce scenario 4, whereby a 
vertically integrated supply chain that is geographically confined emerges in the US and European 
markets.  
In view of the implications of this for efficiency, but also for the distribution of benefits of the value 
chain that are considered important for high-tech areas, it is important that further analysis takes place 
in the European space sector in regards to the industrial policies across the overall aerospace sector 
value chains. This is reinforced by the critical role not only controversial economic return literature and 
reports claim, but by (still to this date) studies with limited examination of the allocation and its 
efficiency available (Logsdon et al., 1998, p. 432).  
Finally, the limited number of detailed analysis on such industrial externalities through modeling and 
causality analysis, does not allow the comparative assessment of the present with alternative scenarios 
in terms of economic return. Such alternative scenarios would be necessary to examine more precisely 
the economic implications of the fair, return, best practices, contractual allocations for the European 
space sector. Even more important perhaps is the implications of this for the aerospace sector in general 
that shares similar corporate roofs as space firms and also engages in highly competitive global 
aerospace markets. 
 
5. Strategic Considerations and Policy Implications 
Internal mechanism, clarity in political objectives and their implementation for the decision-making 
framework and publicly available contracting information are potentially measures for diminishing 
transaction costs and enhancing efficiency. 
In addition, it can be argued that based on such selecting approaches and implementation, the 
relationship between the contractor and the agency resembles more of a PPP than a market transaction. 
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Clearly this is not supported by the contractual relationship, but arguably, the de-facto limitations of the 
subcontractors selection process imposes restrictions that may affect accountability of the contractor in 
contractual performance.  
Finally, this practice of subcontractor selection faces yet another challenge, whereby the (prime) 
contractor might be making selections based on strategic considerations. For example, the contractor 
might be competing with a candidate subcontractor in other market segments. The presence of 
economies of scale and scope can potentially complicate relevant arguments and competition rationales, 
involving the agency in anti-competitive framework discussions and disputes, which have far-reaching 
implications, also for other (aerospace) markets. Future analysis may well consider the public 
regulation and policies implications as they may act as proxies for behavior under market structures 
that may have undesirable effects to stated objectives and efficiency. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the procurement practices and challenges faced by the European 
intergovernmental space agency, ESA. Specifically, the consolidation of the industry challenges the 
application of its “fair return” objective. The policy of exercising control over the entire value added 
chain in the European space sector is seen as a method to mitigate this, but clearly with potential 
drawbacks. These can take the form of blurred accountability in contractor performance and added 
transaction costs throughout the supply chain, but also augmented moral hazard and adverse selection 
challenges. Further analysis and transparency in information is recommended for a more complete 
analysis of the implications of contracting and selection practices not just in the sector, but the 
aerospace industry performance as a whole.  
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Notes 
Note 1. A version of this paper was presented at the 19th International Conference on Economics and 
Security 2015, Grenoble, France. 
Note 2. This became all evident under the Galileo program and the formation of the Galileo Joint 
Undertaking (GJU) as a public-private-partnership between these two European partners. The role 
distinctions were not clear from the very beginning, but there were also differences in terms of their 
culture and mandate of the Commission with regards to the preference for open competition, as 
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opposed to fair return approached in procurement employed by ESA. 
Note 3. Transpace versus Arianespace, see Reagan, 1985; and Zervos, 2002; Van Fenemma, 1999 for 
further discussion and implications. 
Note 4. See Zervos 2011b for a description of a two-step process in contracting and procurement in the 
presence of a space agency. 
Note 5. The complexity term is well justified in the case of Europe, more so perhaps than the original 
US-based derivation of the term “industrial complex” by examining the political landscape of Europe 
(even compared with US, or other Federal system whereby Congress encapsulates 
geographical/regional industrial considerations). 
Note 6. “The hypothesis set is whether there is a need for public policy in Europe and the US to prevent 
high profile, vertical consolidation of their domestic space industries. The answer to this cannot be 
negative, based on arguments of the presence of monopolization of a market in the face of such 
consolidation, as such mergers can lessen competition in the subcontractors markets, but not in favor of 
the merged entity, as other integrators can also establish in-house production” (Zervos, 2000, p. 2). 
Note 7. See for example, CSIS, 2008 for challenges associated with the policy, that despite recent 
reforms and developments is still under discussion. European and other nations have similar policies, 
but arguably less open to public debate. 
Note 8. This “augmented” model results in an increase in the number of combinations of different 
market structures, taking into account both integrators and subcontractors market changes. For example, 
the model can be solved for open US public space market, closed EU public space market, open US 
subcontractors market, closed EU subcontractors market, etc. There is a total of nine combinations 
(assuming “open US”, “closed EU” give symmetric results to “closed US”, “open EU” at both 
integrators and subcontractors markets, otherwise there would be 16 combinations). 
Note 9. It would be expected that this happens as it makes no sense for them to voluntarily face a 
monopoly. 
Note 10. In terms of competitive outcome for the public and commercial final output markets, this 
market structure can be described by paraphrasing Adam Smith as a major conspiracy between 
suppliers (and bureaucracy) against the public interest. 
 
